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Reviewed by: Yuan Ji
On January 26, 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
commenced the trial of Thomas Lubanga, a Congolese militia leader whose
followers have been accused of gross human rights violations including
rape, ethnic massacre, torture, and conscription of child soldiers. This was
a noteworthy day in the history of international criminal justice, as the
Lubanga trial was the first trial held at the ICC since the Court came into
existence almost seven years ago. This year is also significant because the
Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over aggression, a term to be
defined no earlier than seven years after the Statute goes into effect, and
July 2009 will mark the Statute's seven-year anniversary. In this context,
the recent publication of Michael Struett's The Politics of Constructing the
International Criminal Court comes as a timely analysis of and tribute to the
Rome Statute, whose ratification on July 1, 2002 activated the ICC's
existence in international law and global governance.
The most interesting question that the book seeks to answer is this:
why were so many nation-states willing to reduce their own sovereignties
by granting significant authority to a strong, independent international
tribunal? In answering this question, Struett places unique emphasis on
the discourse by various non-governmental organization (NGO) advocates
during the ratification process. Struett makes a valuable contribution to
existing scholarship in the field' by explaining the discursive role that
1. Although previous scholars have not shared Struett's focus on the NGOs' role during
the Rome negotiations, existing scholarship discusses various nation-states' concerns about
potential compromises of their own sovereignties and the crucial role that the ICC's
complementary jurisdiction plays in their willingness to ratify the Rome Statute. See, e.g.,
COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY : PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ROUNDTABLE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 1
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NGOs can play in forming international policy consensus between
sovereign nations, and by highlighting the results of the NGOs' dialogue.
While this focus on NGOs is a unique contribution to existing analyses of
the ICC, the broad membership of the NGO community makes it difficult
to account in detail the motives, roles, and actions of specific non-
governmental entities that were involved in the ICC negotiations.
Understanding the reasons behind individual NGOs' involvements at
different phases of the ICC construction is important and informative, since
there can be significant disparities in their interests and sources of financial
support. Even though Struett may not wish to focus on these reasons, their
absence is a potential weakness of Struett's work. Additionally, Struett's
narrative pays particular attention to the United States' involvement
throughout the negotiation process which, as this review will discuss later,
is not an entirely unjustified bias.
The ICC is the first international tribunal vested with permanent
authority to try criminal cases against individual perpetrators of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In that context, the formation of
the ICC may mark the end of a history in which individuals responsible for
the most heinous crimes of mass violence could act with impunity and
without fear of legal consequences. Struett's book offers an insightful
analysis of the key features of the ICC, the events leading up to its
ratification, and the strategies of pro-ICC organizations that proved
effective during negotiations. Struett's central claim is that NGOs played a
crucial role in developing the Rome Statute and in securing enough
signatures to effect its ratification less than four years after the Statute first
opened for signatures. His account outlines how NGOs used rational
arguments and common-ground norms effectively to persuade an
international audience.
Struett acknowledges the notion of state sovereignty as the key reason
why earlier discussions of establishing an international criminal tribunal
failed to lead to a permanent court like the ICC. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, NGOs presented arguments advocating the establishment of an
international criminal court; although these arguments were considered by
the United Nations General Assembly's Sixth Committee in the late 1950s,
at the time they were not fruitful. This raises a possible critique of Struett's
central thesis: if NGOs did play a pivotal role in the establishment of the
ICC in the 1990s, why were they not able to accomplish the same goal four
decades earlier? Struett anticipates this question and responds by pointing
to the polarized political atmosphere during the Cold War era. As the two
ideological camps developed and diverged during this period, the notion
of a neutral tribunal adjudicating in complete freedom from the influence
AMSTERDAM 25/26 JUNE 2004 (Uann K. Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2006); STATES' RESPONSES
To ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE: CONSTITUTIONAL, SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL
COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL LAW (Roy S. Lee, ed., 2005).
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of either superpower became less credible.2 Furthermore, Struett suggests
that the prevailing understanding during the 1950s of the mutually
exclusive sovereignties of states was incompatible with the intrusion of an
independent institution's enforcement of international criminal law. Of
course, later efforts to create an international criminal tribunal in the 1990s
faced this same problem, but Struett posits that it was much more difficult
to make a normative argument favoring a neutral third-party body of
adjudication in a world divided into two ideological camps, each of which
viewed the other as a constant source of threat and distrust. Although the
United States and the Soviet Union cooperated to establish tribunals
during the post-World War II period and could have cooperated to
establish a permanent court,3 Struett observes that the two countries
limited their cooperation to examining the Axis powers' culpability instead
of their own.4 Because most participants in the dialogue in the 1950s
concerning the establishment of an ICC were state representatives or state-
appointed members of the International Law Commission,5 the dialogue
was also limited to formal authority figures who did not necessarily have
decision-making powers within their respective countries. Vulnerable
populations who would later become victims of war crimes, genocides, and
crimes against humanity did not have "sufficient voice within civil society
to bring their views to bear on the decision-makers in national
government."6 All of these factors contributed to the failure among states
to establish an international criminal tribunal in the 1950s.
The post-Cold War years presented the NGO community with an
opportunity to garner support for an international tribunal. Pro-ICC
NGOs successfully formed a coalition and expanded membership through
outreach to other NGOs. As an illustration of the coalition's success, about
1,500 NGOs were present at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
in Vienna, which provided a forum for networking among NGOs
committed to the promotion of an ICC. A year later, these NGOs
participated in a conference call and established the Coalition for an
International Criminal Court.7 They agreed to coordinate efforts during
2. MICHAEL J. STRUETr, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: NGOs, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 55 (2008).
3. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a charter for the Nuremberg court on
August 8, 1945, and later cooperated to operate the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East in 1946.
4. STRUETT, supra note 2, at 53.
5. The International Law Commission was established by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948 to promote the development and codification of international law. Instead
of serving as representatives with decision-making powers within their respective states,
"[tihe members of the ILC are elected in their individual capacities to provide their own
unique expert judgments on the evolution of international law. However, they are nominated
by governments, and their own views on international law historically have reflected the
views of their government." STRuETr, supra note 2, at 56-57.
6. Id. at 65.
7. The use of conference call technology is important, since Struett identifies technical
complexity as another obstacle to coordinating dissenting voices and to reaching compromises 3
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the upcoming consideration of a draft ICC statute by the United Nations
General Assembly's Sixth Committee. The NGO coalition effectively
increased its claim to legitimacy by publishing objective opinions detailing
reasons to advocate both for and against the formation of an ICC.8
Additionally, the coalition of NGOs was also willing to consider different
blueprints for the court's design. Struett makes the revealing observation
that unlike state representatives, whose legitimacy lies in their selection by
their respective states, NGOs can only maintain their legitimacy by making
arguments that appeal to reason rather than to power. The net result was
that instead of allowing representatives from a few states to focus only on
elements of the Rome Statute that were of interest to them, the NGOs
shaped the discussion into one involving state and non-state
representatives interested in a variety of issues.
In Struett's terminology, the NGOs' persuasive legitimacy was just as
influential as the states' representational legitimacy, and the negotiations
became communicative and rational rather than strategic as a result.
Struett illustrates the difference between communicative and strategic
arguments during the Rome negotiations by examining the dialogue
generated by the United States' contention that the ICC should not exercise
jurisdiction over states without their consent. 9  Stating the accepted
principle of international treaty law that treaties cannot create new
obligations for non-participating parties is an example of a
communicatively rational argument. A strategic argument, on the other
hand, might reason that U.S. citizens should be exempt from unwanted
ICC jurisdiction since the United States plays a unique role in maintaining
international peace and security. According to Struett, the United States
made both kinds of arguments during the ICC debate. The
communicatively rational argument was widely accepted by participants in
the debate, but the strategic one was not.
Struett convincingly argues that the foundation of the NGOs'
persuasive legitimacy lies in their discursive practice of establishing topoi,
or common premises shared by nation-states, and that making arguments
based on these mutual standards was instrumental in the early stages of
ICC negotiations. The four topoi that emerged from the ICC debate are
encapsulated by Struett as follows:
1. The need to end a history of immunity for individual leaders who
commit crimes in the name of their states,
2. The importance of providing equal justice for individuals who have
committed similar criminal violations of international law,
during the 1950s discussions of forming a permanent international tribunal.
8. MICHAEL J. STRUETT, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: NGOs, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 79 (2008).
9. Id. at 125.
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regardless of the time and place of perpetration,
3. The grounding of the ICC in existing international statutes so that it
does not create new international law but can claim
jurisdiction over the most odious crimes already recognized by
existing law, and
4. The existence of procedures that protect the rights of the accused
with a presumption of innocence.
With a focus on the first two in particular, Struett analyzes and
provides specific examples of NGOs' efforts in establishing these four
common premises. Once the topoi gained mainstream acceptance in the
international community, they created a common starting point in the
dialogue among nation-states so that arguments based on these topoi were
given greater consideration in the negotiation process. An illustration of
NGOs' efforts to establish topoi can be found in a 1996 Human Rights
Watch paper10 that emphasized the urgent need to end impunity for the
most egregious human rights crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. Struett claims that the NGO strategy in this
paper was to create a sense of urgency by reminding state delegates that
contrary to the first topos in the outline above, the "atrocious crimes under
consideration were recurring problems in the contemporary world." As
this invocation of urgency gained wider acceptance through later
negotiations, the need to end impunity for the crimes listed above
eventually became the foundation for subsequent negotiations among
nation-states." As evidence for this acceptance, Struett observes that
policy recommendations made by the 1996 Human Rights Watch paper
regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the complementarity regime, and the
mechanisms for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction were all incorporated into
the final policy choices made in the Rome Statute.
As negotiations progressed, NGOs' continued appeal to topoi played a
crucial role in four important issues that Struett thoughtfully explicates in
his book: the list and definition of crimes to be included in the ICC's
jurisdiction, the complementary structure of jurisdiction between ICC and
domestic tribunals within individual nation-states, the trigger mechanism
for activating ICC jurisdiction, and the pace of progress in the negotiations.
At the Rome Conference, from which the Rome Statute was to emerge,
NGOs demonstrated remarkable dexterity in modifying their positions in
response to new issues that emerged in the course of discussion and
offering counterproposals after quick analyses of the new issues. One of
their initiatives sought to identify students and faculty from law schools in
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTARY FOR THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1996).
11. STRUETr, supra note 7, at 89. 5
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the United States and Western Europe who would be willing to serve as
legal counsel for less developed nations 12 in order to ensure that their
voices would be heard in the ICC negotiations. NGOs took assertive but
persuasive stances on the definition of key terms such as "genocide" and,
at the same time, kept in mind the compromises necessary to ensure the
passage of the Statute. As a result, consensus began to form that the ICC
should be granted inherent jurisdiction over three categories of crimes:
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In this way, NGOs'
efforts had a direct impact on the final wording of the Rome Statute and
consequently, on the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction.
In the ratification process of the Rome Statute, the NGOs acted
strategically by focusing on getting signatures rather than ratifications
from the nation-states. 13  A state's signature, although not binding,
expresses its intent to ratify later and to not act contrary to the terms of the
treaty in the interim. Because ratifications from 60 states were required to
enact the ICC, the NGOs focused on obtaining signatures first, which were
much easier to grant within the political structures of individual nation-
states. As more signatures were collected, the general pattern established
was then used to convince nation-states that the ICC was likely to be
ratified and that its jurisdiction would not be geographically limited to the
few states that chose to ratify early on in the process.
14
Struett also proposes that by actively advocating complementary
jurisdiction as a mechanism to curtail the Court's power, the NGO
community played a crucial role in persuading states to agree to
constraints upon their sovereignty in support of an international court such
as the ICC. The Rome Statute provides that any case already subject to a
genuine investigation and prosecution in a national court cannot be heard
by the ICC, with the caveat that ICC can make the final determination of
the prosecution's genuineness. States' willingness to reduce their own
sovereignty in deference to the ICC is not only grounded in the
complementary nature of its jurisdiction but also in its permanence.
Because ad hoc tribunals relied on external military backing to control
regions crucial to gathering witness testimony and evidentiary
documentation, they had to be established quickly before political support
for providing the necessary troops waned.15 Local cooperation was often
unavailable or half-hearted, especially if the accused still enjoyed political
or military power in the country. Struett suggests that as a permanent
court with wide support from the global community and therefore less
need for support from particular power(s), the ICC effectively avoids
12. These countries included Sierra Leone and Bosnia, which had recently witnessed
crimes covered under the ICC's jurisdiction.
13. STRUErr, supra note 7, at 134-35.
14. Under the terms of the Rome Statute, such geographical limitations no longer apply
once the Statute is activated by reaching a minimum of 60 state ratifications. After activation,
the Statute extends jurisdiction to all states that have signed onto the treaty.
15. STRUETr, supra note 7, at 161.
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problems that ad hoc war crime tribunals had encountered in the past and
therefore is more persuasive in soliciting nation-states' willingness to
reduce their own sovereignties to a legitimate international court.
One bias in Struett's perspective is his particular emphasis on the
United States' attitudes and incentives throughout the negotiation and
ratification process of the ICC. In the early 1990s, for example, Struett
suggests that because the U.S. government was involved in military
conflicts with states when it would have likely preferred to prosecute
individual leaders, 6 the idea of a permanent international criminal tribunal
was an appealing one. However, Struett offers justification for his focus on
the United States' political atmosphere by explaining that if the U.S. had
shown outright opposition in the beginning stages of the negotiations, the
other states would have been much less inclined to pursue the
establishment of an international criminal court. In addition, Struett
observes that the United States had historically been an advocate of the
rule of law in the international community. Its concern that its sovereignty
might be compromised was shared by other states, and any hesitation that
the United States had shown in endorsing the ICC probably would have
been a fair barometer of the general sentiments shared by other states
involved in the negotiations. In this sense, Struett's emphasis on the
United States is justified and gives a pre-ICC context to the Bush
administration's withdrawal of the United States' signature in May 2002.
This decision not only runs counter to the United States' tradition of
leadership in international justice but, more alarmingly, undermines the
ICC's efficacy in providing equal justice by decreasing the tribunal's
legitimacy in the eyes of the other countries in the world.
By presenting the motives and arguments advanced by the U.S. and
other major state players throughout the negotiations, and by examining
NGOs' discursive interactions with them in the process, The Politics of
Constructing the International Criminal Court offers an insightful analysis of
the process of compromise leading up to the birth of the ICC and NGOs'
persuasive role in this process. The success of these NGOs is especially
impressive given the significant disagreement during negotiations on a
wide array of issues. One of the most controversial questions was whether
the Statute should grant the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression;
despite the best efforts of NGOs. ultimately the decision of this issue was
postponed to prevent negotiations from stalling. Article Five of the Rome
Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over aggression, but the term
"aggression" still awaits a definition via the amendment process and must
be accepted by seven-eighths of ICC members no earlier than seven years
after the launch of the Statute. With the seven-year anniversary of the
establishment of the Rome Statute fast approaching, it will be interesting to
16. Examples of such individuals include Libya's Quaddafi, Panama's Noriega, and Iraq's
Hussein. 7
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watch what kind of role the NGOs will play in the negotiations concerning
aggression and, consequently, in the potential expansion of the ICC's
jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
"When I was 13 years old, I delivered a plain white envelope
containing a $50 bill to the chief of police of Paterson, New Jersey."
Eric M. Uslaner begins Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law by
describing his memory of delivering a small bribe on his father's behalf.' It
is a dramatic opening anecdote, and it suggests the author's fascination
with corruption as the product of complicated and diverse human
interactions. The senior Uslaner was motivated by a desire to increase
business in his stationery store, and he perceived his offering as an act of
good faith rather than a contribution to endemic corruption. His son,
however, uses the story to introduce an empirical evaluation of corruption
writ large in support of a sweeping descriptive theory of its causes. The
tension between these two forms of analysis - one anecdotal,2 and the
other empirical - is salient throughout the book. It underlies the failure of
some of Uslaner's central claims, but also speaks to the book's latent
strengths.
In the chapters that follow, Uslaner proposes a novel and analytically
appealing account of the relationship between trust, inequality, and
1. ERIC M. USLANER, CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2008).
2. In this review, we use the term "anecdotal" primarily to refer to Uslaner's narrative
accounts of corruption in country-specific case studies (although the opening vignette
described here is, admittedly, a more traditional anecdote). As these types of case studies
vivify rather than inform a predictive global theory of corruption, we use the word
"anecdotal" to emphasize their differences from a data-driven, empirical analysis.
9
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corruption, which form what he terms the "Inequality Trap."3  He
describes this theory, and the global empirical analysis that he uses to test
it, in the book's first three chapters. The next five chapters examine
individual countries - post-Soviet transition countries (Romania in
particular), African nations, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the United
States. These case studies combine some country-specific empirical
analysis with textured descriptions of each country's unique cultural,
political, and historical characteristics. Most of these countries do not seem
to have succumbed to the Inequality Trap, and Uslaner introduces the case
studies in an attempt to reconcile these outliers with his global theory.
Finally, Uslaner concludes with ameliorative policy prescriptions,
advocating enhanced social welfare programs as a way out of the
Inequality Trap.
Uslaner's global empirical model tackles a set of issues (including trust
and corruption generally) that defy precise definition and measurement,
and his approach and conclusions are accordingly both fascinating and
problematic. Although his worldwide measurements of phenomena like
"out-group trust" are exciting contributions to development scholarship,
he often uses dubious proxy measures and seems, at times, impatient with
his own data and analysis. The book's overarching weakness, however, is
larger, more serious, and even acknowledged, if half-heartedly, by the
author: the global empirical results simply do not support his descriptive
theory of corruption.
Instead, in Uslaner's narrative, anecdotal accounts of corruption are
often more compelling than his empirical models. 4 Unlike his global
Inequality Trap theory, these accounts are distinctively local and can take
into consideration a state's history, culture, population composition, and
other subtle characteristics. His analysis of New Jersey is a good example:
although Uslaner goes to great pains to distinguish between petty and
grand corruption in his broad empirical analysis, his opening paragraphs
tell a story that links the petty corruption he witnessed as a child to the
multimillion-dollar graft of Patterson officials decades later - a single,
linear tradition of dishonest New Jersey government, reflected in its unique
"anecdotal" history.
Uslaner addresses one of development's most fundamental problems,
and while he fails to fully accomplish his goals, his theory and empirical
analysis advance the field. The problems Uslaner faces in finding
measures for his key variables and aggregating them across nations are
endemic to comparative empirical analyses of corruption, and do not
3. USLANER, supra note 1, at 24.
4. It is important to note, however, that these anecdotal case studies are most meaningful
in the specific context of the country they describe. While Uslaner's description of corruption
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nullify his contribution to the literature. Instead, they suggest a perhaps
inevitable recourse to local, "anecdotal" accounts of corruption.5
I. EMPIRICAL WEAKNESSES
Uslaner's central thesis is that high inequality leads to low trust in
members of different social groups (low "out-group" trust), which in turn
causes corruption and ultimately more inequality - creating an Inequality
Trap worldwide. Groups that fare economically poorly are skeptical of
prosperous groups, and inequality thereby leads to low trust. Coupling
low out-group with high in-group trust generates corruption. Groups that
feel socially marginalized create patron-client relationships and an "us
versus them" atmosphere that feed on corruption and undermine good
governance. The corrupt government that results has fewer resources to
combat poverty and inequality, and is less capable of governing effectively
(closing the Inequality Trap loop). This is a sensible argument, and
Uslaner provides a convincing theoretical account for why it might be true.
The difficulty, however, is that his data does not support his thesis -
unsurprisingly, given the barriers to proving a descriptive thesis
explaining such a complex phenomenon.6
Uslaner's aggregate analysis is a remarkably ambitious empirical
project.7 Unfortunately, the model's inputs strain its credibility. In order
to overcome the impossibility of measuring factors like "trust" directly, for
example, Uslaner relies on dubious proxies. "Generalized trust" is
imputed to different countries (extrapolating from a World Values Survey
covering a smaller set of nations)s based on gross national product per
capita, import values, legislative effectiveness, type of head of state, tenure
of executive, and openness of the economy.9  Uslaner's finding that
generalized trust levels are correlated with corruption is perhaps less
powerful than it seems, then, if inputs like "legislative effectiveness" are
both related to corruption and used to calculate generalized trust. Another
5. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lancaster & Gabriella R. Montinola, Toward a Methodology for the
Comparative Study of Political Corruption, 27 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 185, 185 (1997)
("[Plroblems of definition, operationalization, and measurement have thus far constrained
most students of corruption to ideographic single case studies.").
6. Jong-Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram undertake a similarly ambitious empirical
analysis with similarly indeterminate results. See Jong-Sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A
Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption, 70 AM. Soc. REV. 136 (2005).
7. He readily admits, "With relatively little movement over time and with a paucity of
longitudinal data, statistical analysis is unlikely to be the best tool to uncover whether there is
a way out of the inequality trap." USLANER, supra note 1, at 242.
8. See World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2009) ("The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political
change .... Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative samples of the
publics of more than 80 societies on all six inhabited continents.").
9. USLANER, supra note 1, at 52 n.20.
11
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example: to measure "particularized trust,"10 Uslaner considers the legal
ease of converting to a minority religion." Unlike the proxy for
"generalized trust," which considered too many variables, this proxy
considers too few. While it seems sensible that respect for minority
religions would be related to both out-group trust and the legal ease of
converting to those religions, this proxy is not exact enough to justify his
empirical conclusions.
Uslaner faces similar problems in his country-specific empirical
analyses. Unable to measure corruption in the United States in the 1930s,
for example, he approximates it based on the percentage of each state's
population that voted for Robert LaFollette, a Progressive party
presidential candidate who ran on a platform of clean government.12 He
finds, as a result, that the upper Midwest was the least corrupt area of the
United States, and proposes the Scandinavian heritage of its residents as
the explanation.13 Like his trust measurements, this proxy is problematic.
Presidential elections and voter behavior are, of course, extremely
complicated. Beyond the dubiousness of using state-by-state presidential
results as a proxy for state government corruption, it is certainly true that
Robert LaFollette received a larger share of the upper-Midwest vote
because he was a Wisconsin Senator. LaFollette's anti-corruption themed
campaign is, as a result, not a sound foundation for an empirical model.
Compounding the problem with Uslaner's proxies is a broader issue
that the author does not deny: the outcomes of his empirical models do not
convincingly support the Inequality Trap thesis. At the aggregate level,
Uslaner admits that "[t]he link from inequality to corruption is weak" -
which is to say, he finds no statistically significant direct relationship
between the two.14 Uslaner attempts to overcome this by pointing to links
between inequality and trust and between trust and corruption. 5 The
result underwhelms in the aggregate analysis and is virtually nonexistent
in the case studies, which are devoted primarily to countries whose
inequality, trust, and corruption levels do not fit the Inequality Trap thesis
at all. Eastern European countries are deeply corrupt, but have low levels
of inequality,16 and Hong Kong and Singapore are the exact opposite.
17
Finally, Botswana and the United States are more moderate outliers, with
far less corruption than their levels of inequality would suggest under
10. Particularized trust is trust in members of one's own group.
11. USLANER, supra note 1, at 66.
12. Id. at 228.
13. Scandinavian countries are famously "clean." See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2008), available at
http://www.transparency.org/news-room/ in-focus/2008/cpi2OO8/cpi-2008-table.
14. USLANER, supra note 1, at 5.
15. "The most important result is that there is an indirect linkage between inequality and
corruption and it goes through trust." Id. at 71.
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id. at 181.
[Vol. 12
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Uslaner's model.
18
The weaknesses of Uslaner's empirical models are not unique; to the
contrary, they may be unavoidable in a worldwide statistical analysis of
intangibles like "trust" and "corruption," and may speak to the limited
utility of these models in development scholarship.19 Although Uslaner
acknowledges many of the problems addressed above, he does not tailor
his conclusions to reflect the limitations of his data.20 Instead, Uslaner
makes affirmative empirical assertions on the basis of his models - both at
the broadest level (the Inequality Trap thesis) and with regard to specifics
(for example, Uslaner claims that "Finland would be as risky for investors
as Argentina if it were as corrupt as Bangladesh" or that "[rlaising the trust
level of Brazil.. .to Norway's top rating would raise its quality of
government to midway between Spain and Thailand"). 21 When the inputs
to his models include imputed trust calculations and Robert LaFollette
voters, positive statements like these reveal Uslaner's ambition
outstripping his data. His affirmative thesis - however theoretically
plausible - is simply too vast to rest on such shaky empirics.
II. NARRATIVE CASE STUDIES' QUALIFIED STRENGTHS
Uslaner stands by his thesis and is accordingly forced to fight some of
his own data. Failing to find a significant direct link between corruption
and inequality, he looks to peoples' perceptions of the link to support the
Inequality Trap in his case study countries. Uslaner insists that these
perceptions are powerful indicators that an Inequality Trap exists, even
though his other empirical findings imply that these perceptions are
flawed. 22 While it may still be true that perceptions of inequality, without
any actual inequality, can lead to corruption, this would be a different
thesis.
Uslaner's other primary strategy to address his empirical weaknesses is
to take refuge in historical or cultural accounts of corruption in the
countries he studies. He explains Romania's combination of low inequality
and high corruption by describing its Ottoman heritage, ethnic rivalries,
18. Id. at 195, 232.
19. For more on the relative merits of using empirical and case study approaches to
corruption, see Sten Widmalm, Explaining Corruption at the Village and Individual Level in India:
Findings from a Study of the Panchayati Raj Reforms, 45 ASIAN SURVEY 756 (2005).
20. For a more limited and credible use of proxy measures in the study of a similar
phenomenon, see, e.g., Martin Raiser et al., Trust in Transition: Cross-Country and Firm Evidence,
24 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 407 (limiting its conclusions to trust in business settings, not trust
generally).
21. USLANER, supra note 1, at 73.
22. As an example, the French and the Japanese, who enjoy relatively corruption-free
governments, believe that grand corruption is as big a problem in their countries as Kenyans
and Bulgarians do in theirs. Id. at 90.
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and "fatalistic" culture. 23 To understand Estonia's success relative to other
transition countries, he considers its energy independence, autonomy
under the Soviets, and close ties to Finland.24 The list goes on: Hong Kong
and Singapore are small city-states; Botswana has limited inherent appeal
to foreign investors; the Nordic countries have no history of feudalism;
Americans are comfortable with economic inequality. This approach
reveals the limits of Uslaner's worldwide Inequality Trap thesis. Rather
than relying on a systematic, uniform empirical model, Uslaner must resort
to these narrative, anecdotal accounts to explain the phenomenon in any
given country. The Inequality Trap's failure is instructive, calling into
question both its own utility and that of any similarly broad theory of
corruption.
Uslaner's fidelity to the Inequality Trap prevents him from
considering the historical and cultural characteristics specific to each
country as seriously as he otherwise might. In evaluating Hong Kong and
Singapore, for example, Uslaner might have had a more compelling
explanation for their success were he less focused on the link between
economic inequality and corruption, and more on their overall wealth.
25
Instead, Uslaner makes only two brief mentions of the "robust
econom[ies]" in these "clean" city-states. 26 The Inequality Trap is blind to
this explanatory elephant in the room.
The other serious problem with a reluctant and partially-defended
anecdotal account of corruption is its vulnerability to counterexamples.
27
Uslaner's discussion of Botswana highlights this most clearly. Botswana
defies Uslaner's theoretical predictions. It has a relatively clean
government on a continent that seems otherwise beholden to the Inequality
Trap. His explanation for this is based on a feature particular to the
country's history and geography: Due to Botswana's landlocked position
between historically white racist regimes, it relied heavily on foreign
investment. Since "foreign investors would not put their resources into a
country where corruption ran rampant," Botswana has a clean government
"because it could not afford corruption." 28 In other words, he concludes,
"(Economic) necessity may be the mother of (moral) subvention."
29
Why, if Uslaner is right about Botswana, do we do not see clean
governance in such natural resource hinterlands as Kosovo and Haiti?
23. Id. at 124.
24. Id. at 155-56.
25. Although Uslaner does casually mention that "[ilnequality in a wealthy land may be
less consequential for corruption than an inequitable distribution of resources in a poor
country," this point is relegated to the sixth bullet in a subsection of his seventh chapter. Id. at
212.
26. Id. at 205, 207.
27. See Lancaster, supra note 3, at 203 (recognizing the "idiosyncratic" nature of case
studies).
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Given this reality, what is the real explanation for Botswana's clean
government? Uslaner has no explanation, because his anecdotal account is
only a (perhaps reluctant) supplement to his grander Inequality Trap
argument. By picking and choosing between these arguments based on
explanatory convenience, Uslaner undermines the force of the Inequality
Trap as a globally explanatory tool and becomes vulnerable to objections
based on under-supported anecdotal claims. Sustaining both these
arguments requires a delicate, and sometimes inconsistent, balancing act.
CONCLUSION
In the final pages of Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, Uslaner
candidly acknowledges many of the larger concerns raised here.
"Inequality is clearly not the whole story of why corruption is so
persistent."30 Instead, it may be traceable to "'big slow movements' over
long periods of time," in which case disentangling the causes and effects of
corruption would be "extremely difficult." 31 Although a very detailed
anecdotal account (a comprehensive history, really) may be the only way to
understand corruption, it would be of limited use to scholars seeking
identifiable fixes in the near future. Instead, even an imperfect universal
model - for example, the Inequality Trap - may generate relatively
useful policy prescriptions.
32
Uslaner's policy conclusions are, fittingly, inspired by both the
Inequality Trap and by anecdotal accounts of corruption. His ultimate
recommendation is that "[th]e key mechanism to make people less
dependent upon corrupt leaders is a universal social welfare regime - and
especially one based on upon education for all." 33 Politicians in countries
that enable their citizenry to help themselves through education find little
demand for the help-for-hire that they offer, reducing the inequality that
breeds corruption. As an example of this, Uslaner credits the establishment
of the City University of New York system for cleaning up the famously
corrupt Tammany Hall political machine. While this argument
characteristically straddles the awkward divide between empirical analysis
and anecdotal evidence, Uslaner's predictions and policy prescriptions
should enjoy the luxury of a gentler standard. In this case, a reasonable
and thoughtful analytical effort may be enough.
Perhaps this compromised approach is necessary when addressing a
subject as intractable as worldwide political corruption. Uslaner gets to
this compromise the long way - through aggregate empirical models to
30. Id. at 242.
31. Id. at 244-45.
32. See Lancaster, supra note 3, at 194 ("Meaningful generalizations about political
corruption require going beyond single case studies or theoretical abstractions.").
33. USLANER, supra note 1, at 248.
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particularized historical accounts - and his conclusions feel accordingly
anti-climactic. Nonetheless, an anti-climactic nod to moderation may be
the only way to reconcile theory-driven scholarship with the messy reality
of international development. Uslaner's work accomplishes less than it
sets out to, but perhaps no less than could be reasonably expected.
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